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Mortgage Theory of Ohio
James Jay Brown*
T HE Mississippi RIVER, once used as the geographical dividing
line between the title and lien theory states,1 has lost this
distinction.
Theory Classifications
States by National
Reporter System A B C D E F G H
Atlantic
Maine T T T T
Vermont T T T
New Hamp. T T T
Connecticut T T T L
Rhode Island T T T
New Jersey T T T L
Pennsylvania T T T L
Delaware I T L
Maryland T T T T
New York L L L L L L L
North Eastern
Massachusetts T T T T
Ohio T T L T I
Indiana L L L L L L L
Illinois T T T T
South Eastern
West Virginia T T T
Virginia T T T T
No. Carolina T T T
So. Carolina L L L L L L
Georgia L L L L L
Southern
Florida L L L L L L
Alabama T T T
Mississippi I T T
Louisiana L L L L
South Western
Kentucky L L T L L L L
Tennessee T T T T
Texas L L L L L L L
Arkansas T T T
Missouri I T L
* B.Sc., Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, Univ. of Penna.; Third-
year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 1 Jones, Mortgages, Sec. 59 (7th ed. 1915).
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States by National
Reporter System A B C D E F G H
North Western
Michigan L L L L L L
Wisconsin L L L L L
Iowa L L L L L
Minnesota L L L L L L L
Nebraska L L L L L L
So. Dakota L L L L L
No. Dakota L L L L
Pacific
Kansas L L L L L L L
Oklahoma L L L L L
New Mexico L L L L
Colorado L L L L L L
Wyoming L L
Montana L L L L
Idaho L L L L
Utah L L L L
Arizona L L L
Nevada L L L L
Oregon L L L L L
Washington L L L L L
Alaska
Hawaii
California L L L L L L
Key:
T = Title Theory
I = Intermediate Theory
L = Lien Theory
Classifications by:
A 1 Jones, Mortgages, Sec. 58 (7th ed. 1915).
B 1 Jones, Mortgages, 60 (8th ed. 1928).
C 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 163, nn. 1, 2
(4th ed. 1918).
D Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 1188 (5th ed.
1928).
E White, Ohio Theory of a Mortgage, 3 U. Cinc. L.
Rev., 405 (1929).
F Walsh, Development of the Title and Lien Theories
of Mortgages, 9 N. Y. U. L. Quart. Rev. 280,
300 n. 84, 303 (1932).
G Campbell, Cases on Mortgages, 24 (1926).
H 36 Am. Jur., Mortgages, Sec. 174. See also, Annot.,
93 A. L. R. 12, 25, 31.
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The states of New York, Michigan, Wisconsin, Indiana, and
Florida have made this geographical idea outmoded. Aside from
this, the chart raises some interesting variances in the classifica-
tions of particular states. Connecticut, New Jersey, and Penn-
sylvania, long time advocates of the title theory, have become
identified with the lien theory. Mississippi and Kentucky fluctu-
ate undecidedly. And Delaware, Missouri, and Ohio have the
honor of being identified with all three.
It will be the function of this paper to explore the theory of
the real estate mortgage as it is being used in the confused state
of Ohio. The theories will be identified and defined. From this
academic introduction, practical uses of the theories will be sug-
gested. This will be followed by an analysis of Ohio case
decisions since 1929. The conclusion of this analysis will be a
determination of whether the state has been consistent in its
reasoning and theory.
Theories
The questions of law which are most difficult to answer
are the questions of fundamental theory. They are most
difficult to answer upon reason because they are so far-
reaching in their application as to defy complete understand-
ing and they are most difficult to answer upon authority by
reason of the fact that courts, we will not say because of the
difficulty of the questions, but because of that commendable
conservatism which forbids saying more than is necessary
to reach a decision rarely touch upon them.2
In this statement appears a fundamental truth of our legal
times. The theory of the mortgage, born and bred in the wisdom
of the common law, has been frequently analyzed in its slow
growth, and now has acquired what seems to be a solidified form.
Relying upon the common law and past form, the courts per-
functorily reiterate the theories without a question or doubt that
they represent the contemporary legal status of the mortgagor
and mortgagee. These theories are identified by the terms title,
intermediate, and lien.
A. Title Theory
With its origins in the common law,3 early American law on
mortgages ruled that the mortgagee possessed the title while
2 Durfee, The Lien or Equitable Theory of the Mortgage-Some Generaliza-
tions, 10 Mich. L. Rev. 587 (1912).
3 "At the common law the ordinary mortgage was to all intents and pur-
poses a conveyance of the legal estate. A mortgage in fee immediately
(Continued on next page)
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the mortgagor held (a) the legal right to pay thereby revesting
title in himself, and (b) the equity of redemption. This status
was not altered by the mortgagor's remaining in possession for
practical purposes. This theory has been given many individual
state interpretations 4 and qualifications. 5 Practical considerations
have worn away usual form to decide that the real owner was
the mortgagor as he had been left in possession of the mortgaged
premises.6 Although the term owner could be interpreted to de-
note the holder of title, the mortgagee was left with his right and
power to enter into possession at will. In its normal form, how-
ever, this theory states that the mortgagee becomes vested with
the title to the mortgaged property7 upon execution of the mort-
(Continued from preceding page)
vested the mortgagee with the legal title, subject, however, to be defeated
by the mortgagor's performing the condition by paying the money upon
the prescribed pay-day. If on that very day the mortgagor performed the
condition by paying the money, he thereby put an end to the mortgagee's
estate; the legal estate was revested in himself, and with it he had the
right at once to re-enter upon the land and to recover its possession by an
appropriate action at law. But if the mortgagor for any reason suffered
the pay-day to go by without paying or tendering the amount due, all his
right was utterly and forever lost; the estate of the mortgagee which had
before been upon condition, now became absolute, with all the features and
incidents of absolute legal ownership." 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence,
Sec. 1179 (4th ed. 1918).
In common law phraseology, the mortgagee had, upon execution, an
estate on condition subject to being absolute upon the breach of the con-
dition by nonpayment on the Law Day. Annot., 93 A. L. R. 12, 17. See, the
mortgagee had an estate upon condition subsequent; Durfee, op. cit. supra
n. 2 at 592.
The mortgagor at times has been identified as a tenant: Thunder v.
Belcher, 3 East 449 (1803); Doe d. Roby v. Maisey, 8 B. & C. 767 (1828).
"The mortgagor was not a trespasser but he had no estate in the land,
for he was not even a tenant at will, and therefore the mortgagee could
oust him at any time without notice, quite regardless whether default had
occurred on the mortgage debt; and if the mortgagor resisted, the mortgagee
was entitled to an action of ejectment." 1 Glenn, Mortgages, Deeds of Trust,
and other Security Devices as to Land, 189 (1943). See, Doe d. Roby v.
Maisey, supra. See also, Turner, The Equity of Redemption, 103. Critique
of tenancy notion: Walsh, Development of the Title and Lien Theories of
Mortgages, 9 N. Y. U. L. Quart. Rev. 280, 294 (1932).
4 "This conception of the mortgage (i.e., title theory) is not so consistent
or simple as the lien theory, and it would be difficult to find any two title
states which take exactly the same views of the mortgage." (Parenthesis
added.) Pugh, Some Peculiarities of the Ohio Law of Mortgages on Real
Property, 4 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 297, 298 (1930).
5 1 Glenn, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 190-192.
6 Orr v. Hadley, 36 N. H. 575 (1858); Huckins v. Straw, 34 Me. 166 (1852);
Colton v. Carlisle, 85 Ala. 175, 4 So. 670, 7 Am. St. Rep. 29 (1887); Seaman
v. Bishee, 163 Ill. 91, 45 N. E. 208 (1896).
7 Where the mortgagee becomes vested with title: Childs v. Childs, 10 Ohio
St. 339, 75 Am. Dec. 512 (1859); Frische v. Kramer, 16 Ohio 125, 47 Am.
(Continued on next page)
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gage instrument. As an incident of that title, the mortgagee has
an unqualified right of possession.
B. Intermediate Theory
This theory, named by Professor Campbell,8 is an effort to
maintain the title theory without any of its consequences. In
some title theory states the mortgagee does not acquire title upon
the execution. This only occurs when the mortgage condition has
been broken.9 It is when the mortgagor is in default that the legal
title passes by operation of law from the mortgagor to the mort-
gagee. This point of transfer of title is the distinguishing element
between the two theories. What was an offspring of the title
notion has now become a clearly developed theory. It states that
the mortgagor retains the legal title and right to possession of
the mortgaged premises, at least, until the mortgage condition is
broken. The mortgagee, until that time, retains a lien as security
for his debt. Upon breach of condition, title and right of posses-
sion are automatically transferred.10
C. Lien Theory
From decisions in English Courts of Equity, and under the
influence of Lord Mansfield," a new theory, called the equitable
or lien theory, was carved from the common law. These views
(Continued from preceding page)
Dec. 368 (1847); Bank of Muskingum v. Carpenter, 7 Ohio Rpt. 21, 28 Am.
Dec. 616 (1835), overruled on another point by White v. Denman, 1 Ohio
St. 110, 113 (1853).
8 Campbell, Cases on Mortgages, c. I, Sec. 2; c. XIII, Sec. II n. 1 (1926).
9 Kratz v. Nedelhafen, 193 Ill. 477, 62 N. E. 239 (1901); Ortegen v. Rice,
104 Ill. App. 428 (1902); Carpenter v. Bowen, 42 Miss. 28 (1868); Wilbur v.
Jones, 8 N. J. Eq. 520 (1851); Hagar v. Brainerd, 44 Vt. 294 (1872); Allen
v. Ransom, 44 Mo. 263 (1869). See also Pugh, op cit. supra n. 4 at 302;
Rand v. Kendall, 15 Ohio 671 (1846); Heighway v. Pendleton, 15 Ohio 735(1846); Frische v. Kramer, supra n. 7; Allen v. Everly, 24 Ohio St. 97(1873); Williams v. Englebrecht, 37 Ohio St. 393 (1881); Sun Fire Office v.
Clark, 53 Ohio St. 414, 424, 42 N. E. 248, 250 (1895); Hibbs v. Insurance
Co., 40 Ohio St. 543, 559 (1884); Kern v. Kern, 15 Ohio C. C. (ns) 279,
24 Ohio C. D. 22 (1912), aff'd without opinion, 87 Ohio St. 481, 102 N. E.
1126 (1912); Stripe v. National Fireproofing Co., 5 Ohio App. 210, 215, 21
C. C. (n s) 551 (1916).
10 Bradfield v. Hale, 67 Ohio St. 316, 65 N. E. 1008 (1902). See Denton,
Right of a Mortgagee to Recover Damages from a Third Party for Injury
to Mortgaged Property in Ohio, 3 Ohio St. L. J. 161 (1936).
11 Martin v. Mowlin, 2 Burr. 969 (1760); Ren v. Bulkley, Doug. 292 (1779);
Eaton v. Jacques, Doug. 455 (1780); King v. St. Michaels, Doug. 630 (1781).
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first found favor in New York.1 2 Through wide acceptance in
America the term lien is defined as ". . . any hold which one
person has upon the property of another as security for a debt
or demand." 13 The new theory has been adopted by many
states14 and has been developed into definite form.15 It states that
the mortgagor has the title16 and ownership of the mortgaged
property and the mortgagee has no right to possession. For pos-
session by the mortgagee is not an incident of the mortgage
contract.' 7 Not until foreclosure, sale,i8 and expiration of the
12 Kortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 343, 78 Am. Dec. 145 (1860). See also: Lloyd,
infra n. 13 at 241; 1 Glenn, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 201.
"A mortgage is now nothing but a security for a debt, giving the mort-
gagee a special lien only, upon the estate mortgaged. It conveys no title
to the property. The interest of the mortgagee is a mere chattel interest.
The title and seisin remain in the mortgagor until foreclosure, and he is
not divested of his title until all the steps required by statute have been
complied with." Bryan v. Butts, 26 Barb. 503 (N. Y. 1857).
13 Lloyd, Mortgages-The Genesis of the Lien Theory, 32 Yale L. J. 233,
236-237 (1923).
14 Durfee, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 595.
15 "While the mortgagee is still regarded at law as vested with the legal
title followed by all of its incidents, the following general theory is estab-
lished as a part of the equity jurisprudence. The mortgagor, both after and
before a breach of the condition, is regarded as the real owner of the land
subject to the lien of the mortgage, and liable to have all his estate, inter-
est, and right finally cut off and destroyed by a foreclosure. Prior to such
foreclosure, he is vested with an equitable estate in the land which has all
the incidents of absolute ownership; it may be conveyed or devised, will
descend to his heirs, may be cut up into lesser estates and generally be
dealt with in the same manner as the absolute legal ownership, always
subject, however, to the lien of the mortgage. On the other hand, the
mortgage is regarded primarily as a security; the debt is the principal fact,
and the mortgage is collateral thereto; the interest which it confers on the
mortgagee is a lien on the land, and not on estate in the land; it is a thing
in action, and may therefore be assigned and transferred without a con-
veyance of the land itself; it is personal assets, and on the death of the
mortgagee it passes to his executors or administrators, and not to his heirs."
3 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra, n. 3, Sec. 1181.
16 Pomeroy lists those states following the lien theory (see chart at front
of article). These states vest the mortgagor with legal and equitable title.
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 1188 (5th ed.).
17 "The mortgage is nothing more than a lien on the property. No interest
in the nature of an estate is created; no title either at law or in equity
ever passes to the mortgagee either before or after default nor does he ever
get any right to the possession of the land. If the condition subsequent
contained in the mortgage be not performed, he may foreclose the lien,
have the property sold under order of court and satisfy his claim from the
proceeds of the sale. . . . The mortgagee is simply a creditor with a lien
on the land to secure payment of the debt." Pugh, op. cit. supra n. 4. For
the case development of the problem of possession see Lloyd, op. cit. supra
n. 13 at 243.
1s McDougal, Review of Walsh on Mortgages, 44 Yale L. J. 1278 (1935). See
also: Osborne, Mortgages 34, 311 (1951).
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equity of redemption can he go into possession. The condition
of default by the mortgagor is of no consequence here. What the
mortgagee is given by the contract is a security or lien interest
in the property. 19 His lien is protected against and ahead of other
claimants upon the property.
Definite as the theory might appear, states are varied in their
interpretations of it. Some hold that the mortgage conveys no
title; it merely creates a lien; some create a lien by statutory
enactment; and others hold that the mortgage creates a con-
ditional conveyance giving title to the mortgagee which is realiz-
able in ejectment proceedings. The result is that the mortgagor
is the legal owner for purposes of attachment and execution,
while the mortgagee is the legal owner for the purpose of
possession after default. 20
The effect of adopting the lien theory is to strip the mortgagee
of technical legal title (i.e., title theory) and give him a right of
security in the property. This security can be realized through
the power of sale. Upon default, his remedy is not possession but
foreclosure and sale.
In summary, the theories in their usual form are as follows:
(1) the title theory refers to the rule that the mortgagee acquires
title and is entitled to possession upon the execution of the
mortgage. (2) the intermediate theory refers to the rule that the
mortgagee acquires title and is entitled to possession only upon
default, and (3) the lien theory refers to the rule that the
mortgagee does not acquire title or a right to possession until
foreclosure and sale.
19 ".. . the mortgagor retains all of the legal title, and the mortgagee has
only a lien, which is not title ...
• . . a . . . mortgage lien can only be some legally recognized interest,
or interests, in relation to specific property, which is given as security for
the payment of money, or the performance of some other obligation by the
general owner." Gavit, Under the Lien Theory of Mortgages Is the Mort-
gage Only a Power of Sale?, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 147, 149-150 (1931).
• . . while the mortgage does not convey the legal title to the land until
foreclosure, it does convey to the mortgagee, at the time of its execution,
a present interest in the land, the general ownership of which remains in
the mortgagor-an interest which is limited and special, more analogous to
an easement than to a general ownership; which is contingent or inchoate,
in that default and foreclosure are essential to its ultimate enjoyment; and
which is merely collateral to a principal right to receive something of value;
but which is a legal interest as distinguished from an equitable interest; a
right in rem as distinguished from a right in personam; a right which, in
the terminology of jurisprudence, would be called an 'hypothecation'."
Durfee, The Lien Theory of the Mortgage-Two Crucial Problems, 11 Mich.
L. Rev. 495 (1913).
20 Walsh, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 300.
Sept., 1962
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Thus it is that an American law student is introduced to
the nature of the American mortgage. The writers of this
article are inclined to entertain sympathetically the student's
complaint that his instruction in these theories is useful, if
at all, only in a way not yet disclosed. From them he has
learned little more concerning the law of mortgages than the
juxtaposition of the written terms which has been reviewed.
The student may well complain that he has been led into
a thicket of words, conceivings, theories, doctrine and dogma
and left there. Mere generalization concerning the 'total
nature and effect of a mortgage' may be condemned as the
generalizations of a speculative philosophy. This attempt to
report synoptically on the total nature of 'the mortgage', to
set forth a conceptual entirety of 'the n~iortgage,' is the tech-
nique of the metaphysician.2 1
When we look at these theories individually, unrelated to
practical applications, the truth of the above statement becomes
obvious. Apply, then, the theories with the following hypothetical
problems.2 2 The practical importance of these theories will
become somewhat clearer and indicate the need for an intelligent
use of them.
(I) A, fee simple owner of Blackacre, mortgages it to B in
fee simple as security for a lien from B equal to a third of the
property's value. X, thereafter, procures a judgment against A
in a common law court and attempts an execution against Black-
acre. Can a law execution pick up an equity which has been
ruled to be no "legal estate" at law in a title theory state?
Whereas, in a lien theory state will the execution lie if the
mortgagor is regarded as the real owner of the land subject to
the lien of the mortgage?
(II) A executes a mortgage, later marries, and then dies with
the mortgage unsatisfied. What are the dower rights of A's
widow? Will they vary if the mortgagee dies before foreclosure?
Under the title theory, the widow might have no right if the
legal estate passed to the mortgagee. What would the result be
if A's mortgage was a purchase-money mortgage, executed after
coverture, in which the wife did not join and where A dies
after default?
(III) A, the mortgagor, and B, the mortgagee, expressly
agree that A shall remain in possession during the term of the
21 Sturges and Clark, Legal Theory and Real Property Mortgages, 37 Yale
L. J. 691, 701 (1928).
22 For case citation see: Sturges and Clark, id. at 704-709.
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mortgage. Would the rights and duties of the parties vary (1)
in states having no statutes permitting possession, (2) in states
following one of the three theories?
Ohio Cases
1929, remembered for other reasons, was the last time in
which Ohio's mortgage theory was studied.23 The conclusion of
that work was that Ohio should be re-classified as a lien theory
state. Do the cases since 1929 support this conclusion?
Norwood Savings Bank v. Romer:2 4 In this case concerning
lien rights on after-acquired chattel property, the plaintiff-
mortgagee, Norwood, sought the collection of rent arising after
execution of the mortgage. All rents and profits were pledged
as security under the contract terms. When Norwood brought
his petition before the foreclosure and appointment of a receiver,
the Court of Appeals of Hamilton County ruled against him.
They stated that he was not entitled to rents and profits prior to
the filing of foreclosure proceedings and the appointed receivers
taking possession of the mortgaged property. It appears from this
holding that the mortgagee has no rights in the property, at
least, prior to foreclosure. This clearly coincides with the lien
theory.
Judge Hamilton found support for his conclusion in the
following:
It is settled law that a mortgage is a mere security in
the hands of the mortgagee and does not convey any interest
in the land itself. After mortgage conditions have been
broken, the mortgagee may bring an action for possession, or
an action in foreclosure, resulting in judicial sale. There is
no question that, after condition broken, the mortgagee, upon
bringing an action for foreclosure and making a showing to
the court of the condition broken, has a right to have a
receiver appointed for the property, and the receiver by
virtue of his possession as receiver, is entitled to the rents
and profits that may issue by reason of such possession for
the benefit of the mortgagee. Kerr v. Lydecker, Admr., 51
Ohio St. 240, 37 N. E. 267, 23 L. R. A. 842 (1894).2 5
23 White, Ohio Theory of a Mortgage, 3 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 405 (1929).
24 43 Ohio App. 224, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 472, 183 N. E. 45 (1932). Followed in
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Begin, 59 Ohio App. 5 (1938).
25 Norwood Savings Bank v. Romer, supra n. 24 at 226. Reliance upon the
Kerr Case is unusual as that case held that upon condition broken the
mortgagee was invested with legal title. Possession of title at this point
identifies the intermediate theory. Kerr v. Lydecker, Admr., 51 Ohio St.
240, 250, 37 N. E. 267, 23 L. R. A. 842 (1894).
Sept., 1962
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It has been stated that, even after condition broken, the
mortgagor is entitled to the rents and profits so long as he
retains possession. Fidelity Mortgage Co. v. Mahon, 31 Ohio
App. 151, 166 N. E. 207 (1929).26
In re Blum Bros. Co.: 2 7 although bankruptcy was the point
in issue, this case also involved a surviving spouse's undivided
one-half interest in mortgaged property. The spouse was co-
mortgagor on the mortgage executed as security for a family-
held corporation bond issue. She petitions the bankrupt corpora-
tion for reimbursement of her undivided half-interest in the
property which had been foreclosed and sold.
As security for the payment of the debt, the trustee
upon the default of January 1, 1928, became seized of the
legal title to claimant's (spouse's) interest and the right of
possession, with the option to either foreclose against the
equity of redemption or acquire possession through eject-
ment. Bradfield, et al. v. Hale et al., 67 Ohio St. 316, 65
N. E. 1008.2S (parenthesis added.)
Now, if "the trustee" (for the mortgagee's interest) "be-
came seized of the legal title upon default" not upon foreclosure
and sale, then the court has put itself squarely on point with the
intermediate theory.
Stafford v. Collins, Admr.:29 at the time of the mortgagee's
death, no action of foreclosure or rejectment had been instituted
against the defaulting mortgagor. The mortgagor subsequently
dies and the administrator of his estate attempts to sell the
subject property free and clear of encumbrance. An heir-
assignee of the mortgagee counters this claim by trying to main-
tain a right of title in the property traceable to the mortgagee.
The Second District Court of Appeals in Clark County, relying
upon Ohio General Code Sec. 10509-68 (Sec. 2113.45, Revised
Code),30 ruled for the petitioner-administrator. An heir-assignee
26 Norwood Savings Bank v. Romer, supra n. 24 at 227.
27 55 F. 2d 723 (Ohio Dist. Ct., S. D.), cert. den. 290 U. S. 630, 78 L. Ed.
549, 54 S. Ct. 49 (1932); rev'd on another point 63 F. 2d 212.
28 In re Blum Bros. Co., supra n. 27 at 724, Bradfield has held that as be-
tween the mortgagor and mortgagee in a real estate mortgage, after con-
dition broken, the legal title to the mortgaged premises is in the mort-
gagee. Bradfield v. Hale, supra n. 10.
29 16 Ohio L. Abs. 621 (1933).
30 See Eastwood v. Capel, 126 N. E. 2d 343, 347 (1955): "Unquestionably,
it was the purpose of the legislature to provide that the mortgage lien
should not be separated from the debt in the process of administering
the estate."
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does not acquire a real property interest in the mortgaged prop-
erty, but acquires, merely, a personal property interest. For upon
the death of the mortgagee, who has not instituted foreclosure
proceedings, the real estate interest becomes a personal asset.
The right of ejectment would be, therefore, in the mortgagee's
executor or administrator and not his heirs.
The heir-assignee's case was based upon the argument that
the mortgagee has, upon condition broken, title sufficient to
enable him to secure possession. 31 The Court rejected this inter-
mediate theory argument but in doing so may have rejected all
theories entirely. About title it said: "In the instant case the
mortgagee, although he had legal title to the real estate described
in the petition, never went into possession under his right of
possession." 32 Notwithstanding this statement, the Court con-
cluded that even after condition broken, if the mortgagee has
taken no legal steps to realize his security, he does not become
vested with a title which would descend to his heirs. It would
appear from this conclusion that a title absolute, descendable to
heirs, could only be acquired in foreclosure or ejectment pro-
ceedings. If the rule still exists in Ohio that title absolute in real
property is descendable to the heirs of the title holder, then
what kind of legal title did the Court find in the mortgagee?
If the mortgagee never had title absolute during his lifetime,
then, after condition broken and until foreclosure proceedings,
would the mortgagor have had it? If the case must be ruled
according to statute, is it futile to look for one of the theories?
Union Joint Stock Land Bank of Detroit v. Hurford: 33 Union
Joint Stock was the mortgagee of land which was appropriated,
in part, by the county for highway purposes. Union was never
informed of this situation nor did it receive notice of a settlement
between the mortgagor and the County Commissioners. At issue
was whether Union was an owner of land within the contempla-
tion of statute. Sec. 6870 Ohio General Code (Sec. 5553.11 Re-
vised Code). The Trumbull County Court of Appeals held that
notice of appropriation and settlement need not be given to a
mortgagee for he is not an owner. They support this decision
on the following basis:
31 Kerr v. Lydecker, supra n. 25; Bradfield v. Hale, supra n. 10; Stockwell
v. Gambell, 16 Ohio C. C. (n. s.) 427, aff'd without opinion; Wilson v.
Stockwell, 78 Ohio St. 394, 85 N. E. 1135 (1908).
32 Stafford v. Collins, Admr., supra n. 29 at 624.
33 53 Ohio App. 116, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 232, 6 Ohio Ops. 572, 4 N. E. 2d 276
(1935).
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A mortgage of real estate is regarded, in equity, as a
mere security for the performance of its condition of de-
feasance, and where that condition is the payment of a debt,
the security is regarded as an incident of the debt. Swartz
v. Leist, 13 Ohio St. 419.3 4
. . . the legal title to the mortgaged premises remains
in the mortgagor, as against all the world, except the mort-
gagee, and also as against him until condition broken, but
after condition broken the legal title as between the mort-
gagor and mortgagee is vested in the mortgagee. Allen v.
Everly, 24 Ohio St. 97; Ely v. McGuire, 2 Ohio 223; Hibbs
v. Insurance Co., 40 Ohio St. 543, 559; Martin v. Alter, 42
Ohio St. 94.35
The Court is in effect restating the intermediate theory when it
finds title in the mortgagor "against all the world . . . and also
as against the (mortgagee)" until condition broken. Obvious in
the holding, is the fact that a breach had not occurred. If one
had occurred, who would have received notice of the appropria-
tion, if, according to the statement, between the mortgagor and
mortgagee the latter retains title whereas against all the world
the mortgagor, has title? The Court, by relying on these past
decisions, is perpetuating a two-pronged title dilemma. They
create two legal title holders of the same property when the
mortgage condition is breached.
Hover v. Clayton: 36 This case, decided in the Common Pleas
Court of Logan County, involved mortgaged premises for which
a lease was entered subsequent to the institution of foreclosure
proceedings but prior to actual sale. The lease, executed by the
mortgagor without the consent of the mortgagee, also involved
the sale of certain equipment pledged as security for the mort-
gage. The first major issue decided was what equipment was
part of the realty and what was a fixture. Secondly, the Court
ruled that since the mortgagee was no party to the lease and sale,
the lessee-purchaser could be enjoined from removing such
fixtures from the premises. Finally, under the terms of Ohio
General Code Sec. 11303 the Doctrine of Lis Pendens prohibited
third parties from acquiring an interest in the subject of the
action. The dictum preceding the second issue is interesting
because it establishes a court preference for the intermediate
34 Kerr v. Lydecker, Admr., supra n. 25 at 248.
35 Union Joint Stock Land Bank of Detroit v. Hurford, supra n. 33 at 124.
36 29 Ohio L. Abs. 410, 15 Ohio Ops. 245 (1939).
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol11/iss3/5
11 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
theory. In Tooker v. Grotenkemper3 7 and Frische v. Kramer,"8
"the Court finds that after condition broken, the mortgagee has
the right of possession against a lessee under a lease made after
the mortgage is made . . ." 39 (Emphasis added.)
Taylor, Admr. v. Quinn:40 The petitioner, Taylor, institutes
ejectment proceedings against the defaulting mortgagor. At issue
in this case was whether the remedy of ejectment was available
for a breach of condition. The Court of Appeals of Lucas County
held for the petitioner. It based its decision, in part, upon the
following:
The owner and holder of a mortgage securing debt ...
has two remedies. . . . He may bring an action in fore-
closure of the mortgage . . . Or, he may, after condition
broken, assert title under the mortgage and bring ejectment,
etc. Bradfield v. Hale, 67 Ohio St. 316, 323, 65 N. E. 1008. 4 1
Since Bradfield v. Hale is a leading Ohio case in the theory
of mortgages, it should be explained. In so doing, the theory in
the case at hand ought to be identified. The mortgage in the
Bradfield case contained a condition of defeasance which stated
that the mortgage deed would be voided upon payment of all the
installments. Failure to comply would vest little in the mort-
gagee. That court found, in the law predating the Ohio Civil
Code, that under such mortgage conditions the mortgagee had
the remedies of foreclosure and ejectment. It concluded that as
the Civil Code had not destroyed these remedies, they were still
available. In its statement (above) that court put no qualification
upon foreclosure but injected "after condition broken" upon
ejectment. Did they mean to say that the mortgagee could bring
foreclosure regardless of condition broken? Apparently not, for
it went on, in light of its previous reasoning, to cite Doe v.
Pendleton42 and Kerr v. Lydecker, Admr.43 They stand for the
proposition that upon condition broken, title vests in the mort-
gagee until satisfaction. Satisfaction is a broad term which
would encompass all available remedies. Therefore, putting the
37 13 Ohio Dec. Rep. 433 (1905).
8 16 Ohio 126 (1847).
39 Hover v. Clayton, supra n. 36 at 413.
40 68 Ohio App. 164, 22 Ohio Ops. 292, 39 N. E. 2d 627 (1941).
41 Taylor, Admr. v. Quinn, id. at 166.
42 15 Ohio 735 (1846).
43 Kerr v. Lydecker, Admr., supra n. 25.
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statement and these cases together it must be concluded that
ejectment and foreclosure are only available after condition
broken. As Bradfield states the intermediate theory, Taylor,
Admr. v. Quinn must also do so.
Bruml v. Herold: 44 This case, arising in the Common Pleas
Court of Geauga County, is a basic affirmation of the Taylor case
above. For the Court relies upon Doe v. Pendleton and Kerr v.
Lydecker, Admr.45 The case, therefore, holds to the intermediate
theory. Of special interest is the definition the Court made of
the action of ejectment.
An action in ejectment is purely a possessory action,
and the elements necessary to constitute a cause of action
for Julia Herold (mortgagee) are three only:
That Julia Herold has a legal estate in the real property;
That she is entitled to the immediate possession thereof; and
That Fred Bruml (mortgagor) is unlawfully keeping her
out of possession.
46
Does the mortgagee have a legal estate in the property under
the intermediate or the lien theory? This question will be dis-
cussed in the section below.
McAdams v. Bolsinger: 47 The surviving spouse as co-mort-
gagor seeks to exercise the equity of redemption by purchasing
the mansion house at its appraised value from the inventory of
the estate. The Probate Court of Hamilton County had this to
say as part of its reasoning:
We feel that it is unnecessary to enter into an extended
discussion concerning the exact nature as to the estates and
rights of a mortgagor and mortgagee since legislation views
of those rights differ materially in the various states and
even within the confines of the same state. Generally
speaking, for the purposes of this case, a mortgage is a con-
veyance of an estate or pledge of property, as security for
the payment of money or performance of some other act,
conditioned to become void upon such payment or perform-
ance.
A mortgagor, in Ohio, is commonly said to retain legal
title as to all the world, at least while he remains in posses-
sion, until foreclosure, or until the title is passed to a pur-
chaser at a foreclosure sale.
44 29 Ohio Ops. 146, 14 Ohio Su. 123 (1944).
45 Brumil v. Herold, id. at 148.
46 Brutal v. Herold, id.
47 71 Ohio L. Abs. 531, 57 Ohio Ops. 338, 129 N. E. 2d 878 (1950).
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The mortgagor has seisin in law.48
If the mortgagor retained title from condition broken until fore-
closure, then, the Court is holding with the lien theory.
Levin v. Carney:49 Can a mortgagee of land submitted for
tax sale be termed a "former owner?" To determine the owner
of the subject property, the Court attempted to determine where
title was between the mortgagor and mortgagee. It reiterated
the previous statements from Brad feld and Kerr. From Martin
v. Alter" it quoted:
In the case of a mortgage in the usual form the legal
estate remains in the mortgagor in possession, even after
condition as to all the world, except the mortgagee.
The legal title remaining in the mortgagor is liable to
levy and sale on execution . . .
The latter (mortgagee) may maintain ejectment or take
other legal steps to obtain possession after condition broken,
but until he does so, the mortgagor is at law owner of the
fee. (Emphasis added.)
The court continued in its own words.
The law recognizes two kinds of ownership, equitable
and legal.
An 'equitable owner' is one who is recognized in equity
as owner of the property, because the real and beneficial
use and title belong to him, although the bare legal title is
invested in another.
A 'legal owner' is one in whom the legal title to real
estate is vested, but subject to the rights of any equitable
owner.
.. It has been held that a mortgagor in possession has
both the legal and equitable title. On this theory, this Court,
in Commercial Bank and Savings Co. v. Woodville Savings
Bank Co., 126 Ohio St. 587, 186 N. E. 444, ruled that a mort-
gagor in possession is entitled to the rents and profits of the
real estate, as an incident of possession of the equity of re-
demption. In effect, the court also held in that case that a
mortgagor in possession holds the legal title.
I . . it is somewhat difficult to reconcile all the fore-
going pronouncements relating to the ownership of and title
to mortgaged real estate. In order to determine the ques-
tion of ownership it would appear that the following prin-
ciples may be deduced from the authorities just cited:
48 McAdams v. Bolsinger, id. at 535.
49 161 Ohio St. 513, 53 Ohio Ops. 390, 120 N. E. 2d 92 (1954).
50 Martin v. Alter, 42 Ohio St. 94 (1884).
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1. A mortgage of real property in the usual form is a
mere security for a debt, or for the performance of some
other condition.
2. The legal and equitable title to mortgaged real estate
remains in the mortgagor so long as the condition of the
mortgage remains unbroken.
3. After condition broken, the legal title as between the
mortgagee and mortgagor is vested in the mortgagee, sub-
ject to the equity of redemption.
4. Ordinarily, where the relation of mortgagor and
mortgagee exists, a mortgagor in possession has not only the
right of possession, but this right continues after condition
broken until the period of redemption expires or until the
mortgagee lawfully gains possession.
. . . Applying these principles to the problem to be re-
solved, it would appear that until a mortgage is foreclosed
and a sale consummated, or until a mortgagee obtains pos-
session by ejectment proceedings, the fee to mortgaged real
estate, as stated in Martin v. Alter, supra, remains in the
mortgagor. He is the person with the right to the use and
enjoyment of, and the dominion over, such real estate. The
real and beneficial use belongs to him . . . Until he is
divested of his fee, he is the owner of the property.
• . . It must, therefore, be held under Section 5746, Gen-
eral Code (Section 5723.03, Revised Code), that the term
"former owner or owners" does not include a mortgagee of
mortgaged property where the mortgagor has not been di-
vested of his fee by the legal proceedings.5 1
By their holding the Court makes a clear statement of the lien
theory. But why is their holding in opposition to the third de-
duction from the past Ohio cases when the mortgagor is in tax
default?
Eastwood v. Capel: 52 This case, involving an appeal on
the basis of conflict, involved questions of law about the review
of prior cases. However, part of Judge Skeel's analysis involved
the right and title of the mortgage.
Under the admitted facts of this case, and the law of
the foregoing case (Lessee of Ely v. McGuire, 2 Ohio 223),
and those which follow (Bradford v. Hale, 67 Ohio St. 316,
65 N. E. 1008 and Rands v. Kendal, 15 Ohio 671), title had
passed from the mortgagor to the mortgagee by reason of
51 Levin v. Carney, supra n. 49 at 517-521.
52 126 N. E. 2d 343 (1955).
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the breach of the obligation secured by the mortgage.5 3
(Parenthesis added.)
The opinion further relied upon the Bradfield case to state that
".. . upon default of the obligation of the mortgage debt, the
legal title is in the mortgagee as security for the debt. . .. ," 54
The Court is clearly following the intermediate theory.
Commentary
The cases presented comprise the most important, if not all,
of the applicable cases on Ohio's mortgage theory since 1929.
White's lien theory conclusion obviously has not been accepted
or followed. Of the ten cases, six followed the intermediate
theory, three followed the lien theory, and one was controlled
by statute. The only common factor was a firm reliance upon
the classic cases which were hammered out of Ohio's early legal
history. Without doubt, those cases were excellent for their
socio-economic-political times. But should they govern today?
Do they best reflect the contemporary legal relation of the
mortgagor and mortgagee? Can there be a single theory to fit
all mortgage problems? These questions become important when
we reflect upon the ten decisions. In almost each instance, the
theory issue was of secondary or tertiary importance. The Court
discussions of theory usually formed mere dictum. If, after
thirty-three years, ten cases represent "the pronouncement of
Ohio's theory," then the results of Ohio's rich legal past have
either been taken as settled or have been nearly forgotten.
Notwithstanding the reasons for this situation, the inter-
mediate and lien theories, as they have been used, have weak-
nesses. Where the intermediate theory has been re-stated, the
Court 55 breaks down the ownership of the property between the
mortgagor and the mortgagee. They create separate legal title
holders of the same property for different purposes.50 Whether
this can be justified on legal and equitable grounds is immaterial
because, in the words of the Court, there are two legal title
53 Eastwood v. Capel, id. at 346.
54 Eastwood v. Capel, id. at 347.
55 See Union Joint Stock Land Bank of Detroit v. Hurford, supra n. 33.
56 The molecule of "ownership" has been broken into at least 2 atoms. This
process has been criticised as presenting the incongruous position that one
person may be the legal owner for one purpose, and at the same time
another person may be the legal owner for another purpose. Wilkins v.
French, 20 Me. 111, 117 (1841); Ellison v. Daniels, 11 N. H. 274 (1856);
Stevens v. Turlington, 186 N. C. 191, 194, 119 S. E. 210, 211 (1923). See also
1 Jones, Mortgages, op. cit. supra n. 1 at Sec. 14.
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holders.5 7 The incongruous nature of this conclusion, although
apparently not detrimental to the litigants, commends itself for
re-appraisal on the basis of reason. Instead of perpetuating this
intermediate dilemma, would it not be more logical to label the
mortgagee's property interest for what it actually represents in
the financial community? It is not "legal" title but a security
interest or "security" title. Then for all purposes, the mortgagor
would be recognized as the legal title holder in possession.
A weakness in the use of the lien doctrine concerns the
mortgagee's right of ejectment against the defaulting mortgagor.
In the three lien cases previously discussed, legal title remained
in the mortgagor after condition broken until foreclosure and
sale or until ejectment. Is the latter action available to the
mortgagee? Ejectment was one of the common law remedies,
which has remained in Ohio law,58 and has been altered in other
states. Ejectment has been restricted to usage following fore-
closure and sale5 9 or has been prohibited entirely. 0 Ohio's
57 "An action to recover the title to real property, in Ohio at least, is an
action in equity and an action to recover possession is an action at law.
As between the parties, upon default the legal title to the mortgaged prem-
ises is in the mortgagee, but as to third persons it is in the mortgagor until
foreclosure and sale. It is true that the mortgagee is thus vested with the
title only for the purpose of enabling him to take possession of the land
and hold it as security for his claim." Pugh, op. cit. supra n. 4 at 317.
This quality is not new. It has been a problem in title states holding
the mortgagor the legal owner.
"The inconsistency involved in the cases in these states holding that the
mortgagor is owner at law as well as in equity in cases not involving the
enforcement of the mortgagee's right of possession or not arising between
mortgagee and mortgagor, but insisting on the technical legal title of the
mortgagee in the cases arising directly between them, is obvious. If the
mortgage is held to create a legal lien as security only in these states for
nearly every purpose, of importance, it is quite absurd to revert to the
discarded title theory merely to give the mortgagee a possession of little
or no practical use to him in fact, since he is chargeable for all benefits
derived from such possession in equity. If the modern conception of a
mortgage so adopted in such states at law for most purposes is sound, it
should be consistently applied in all cases, eliminating this distinction be-
tween so-called 'title' and 'lien' states." Walsh, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 303-304.
58 Willis v. Eastern Trust and Banking Co., 169 U. S. 295, 42 L. Ed. 752, 182
S. Ct. 347 (1898); Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 489, 6 L. Ed. 142
(1824); Sears, R. and Co. v. Camp, 142 N. J. Eq. 403, 1 A. 2d 425, 118
A. L. R. 762 (1938); Kerr v. Lydecker, Admr., supra n. 25.
59 Moncreiff v. Hare, 38 Colo. 221, 87 P. 1082, 7 L. R. A. (NS) 1001 (1906);
Vaughn v. Schmalsle, 10 Mont. 186, 25 P. 102 (1890); Douglass v. Thompson,
35 Nev. 196, 127 P. 561 (1912); Cooke v. Cooper, 18 Ore. 142, 22 P. 945,
7 L. R. A. 273 (1889); Dutton v. Warschauer, 21 Cal. 609, 82 Am. Dec. 765
(1863); Grether v. Clark, 75 Iowa 383, 39 N. W. 655, 9 Am. St. Rep. 491
(1888); Nielsen v. Heald, 151 Minn. 181, 186 N. W. 299, 26 A. L. R. 29 (1922);
Holmes v. Gravenhorst, 263 N. Y. 148, 188 N. E. 285, 91 A. L. R. 1230
(Continued on next page)
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statute6 ' has not qualified this remedy. However, past cases have
stated that the writ is available after condition broken.6 2 This
writ, a possessory action at law, is taken out by the holder of
the legal title to recover possession from one holding the
premises under an invalid title.63 The subject of the action is to
try the title to the property.6 4 To be entitled to bring ejectment,
the mortgagee's action must meet the following elements:
(1) The property in question must be real, a corporeal
hereditament,6"
(2) The mortgagee must have the legal title and right
of possession in himself,6 6 and
(3) The mortgagor must be unlawfully withholding
possession from the mortgagee. 67
If the mortgagor retains the legal title after default and while
he is in possession, how can the mortgagee's action fill element
two? He has the burden of establishing more than an equitable
(Continued from preceding page)
(1933); Johnson v. Johnson, 27 S. C. 309, 3 S. E. 606 (1887); Thornley v.
Andrews, 40 Wash. 580, 82 P. 899, 1 L. R. A. (NS) 1036 (1905).
60 Durfee, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 603 n. 8 citing New York and Michigan.
61 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 5303.03 (Gen. Code, Sec. 11903).
02 Bradfield v. Hale, supra n. 10; Stripe v. National Fireproofing Co., supra
n. 9; Kern v. Kern, supra n. 9; Stockwell v. Gambell, supra n. 31.
63 Bartlett v. Bishop of Nevada, 91 P. 2d 828, 834 (Nev. 1939); Brown v.
Eckel, 259 Mich. 55, 244 N. W. 160 (1932).
64 Davis v. Robinson, 374 Ill. 553, 30 N. E. 2d 52, 54 (1940); McCormick v.
McCormick, 221 Ala. 606, 130 So. 226, 227 (1930); Dice v. Reese, 342 Pa. 379,
21 A. 2d 89, 92 (1941).
65 Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 431, 8 L. Ed. 452 (1832); Kingsnorth
v. Baker, 213 Mich. 294, 182 N. W. 108 (1921); Walters v. Sheffield, 75 Fla.
505, 78 So. 539 (1918); Wachstein v. Christopher, 128 Ga. 229, 57 S. E. 511,
119 Am. St. Rep. 381 (1907).
Ejectment will lie for the recovery of a building: Sullivan v. Lawler,
222 Ala. 628, 133 So. 911 (1931); Bensieck v. Cook, 110 Mo. 173, 19 S. W.
642, 33 Am. St. Rep. 422 (1892); White v. White, 16 N. J. L. 202, 31 Am.
Dec. 232 (1837).
66 Barton v. Morris, 15 Ohio 408 (1846); Baker v. Gittings, 16 Ohio 485
(1847); Thompson v. Green, 4 Ohio St. 216 (1854); Turnbull v. Xenia, 80
Ohio App. 389, 36 Ohio Ops. 91, 69 N. E. 2d 378 (1946); Bruml v. Herold,
supra n. 44; Maddox v. Reser, 110 Ohio App. 213, 13 Ohio Ops. 2d 8, 168
N. E. 2d 923 (1959).
67 Maynard v. Cable, Wright 18 (1831); Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15,
28 L. Ed. 52, 3 S. Ct. 495 (1884); Linnerty v. Dorway, 175 Ill. 508, 51 N. E.
809 (1898); Butler v. Frontier Telegraph Co., 186 N. Y. 486, 79 N. E. 716,
11 L. R. A. (NS) 920, 116 Am. St. Rep. 563 (1906); White v. Guirons, Minor
(Ala.) 331, 12 Am. Dec. 56 (1824).
The same elements appear in Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 5303.03 (Gen. Code
Sec. 11903).
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title, 8 and more than a mere naked title without a right of
possession. 9 He should try to prove a perfect legal title,70 al-
though courts have ruled that proof of some kind of legal title
was sufficient.7 1 But, under the lien theory the mortgagee does
not and never had some kind of legal title. He could have legal
title if he relied upon some of Ohio's intermediate theory cases.
But this would subvert the lien doctrine. As Ohio vacillates
between theories so readily, the solution to this legal quandary
lies not in action by the mortgagee, but in judicial decree and/or
legislative enactment.
Prior statutory enactments have not helped to clarify Ohio's
theory. They merely characterize the mortgage as a lien.7 2 But
characterization is not the establishment of a rule. The use of
the word does not, and has not, dictated a theory.
If Ohio is not strictly an intermediate or lien theory state,
then it has the opportunity of forging a new theory. One which
reflects the economic interests and social ideals, conflicting
though they be, of today's mortgage problems. A theory which
reflects what the people are doing.
68 Brockschmidt v. Archer, 64 Ohio St. 502, 60 N. E. 623 (1901).
69 Barton v. Morris, supra n. 66; Cincinnati v. White, supra n. 65.
70 William v. Burnet, Wright 53 (1832); Turnbull v. Xenia, supra n. 66.
71 Thompson v. Green, 4 Ohio St. 216, 224 (1854); Williams v. Veach, 17
Ohio 171, 49 Am. Dec. 453 (1848), a will vested the executor with fee
simple title; Stripe v. National Fireproofing Co., supra n. 9 at 215, title
was found in the holder of the equity of redemption.
72 Ohio Rev. Code, Secs. 5301.39 to 5301.41 (Gen. Code, Secs. 8552 to 8555)
are procedural and use the terminology ". . . a mortgage or other lien . . .";
Rev. Code, Sec. 5301.31 (Gen. Code, Sec. 8546-3), also procedural, states
"... shall transfer not only the lien of said mortgage ... "
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol11/iss3/5
